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From Trayvon Martin1 to Stephan Clark,2 news headlines plague 
the United States to constantly remind Americans that colored 
children do not get the benefit of the doubt in encounters with 
authority figures—that somehow a person’s skin color skin 
influences the probability of his culpability.3  In fact, after analyzing 
available FBI data, reporter Dara Lind found that “[American] police 
kill black people at disproportionate rates: [b]lack people accounted 
for 31% of police killing victims in 2012” while they only accounted 
for 13% of the American population.4  Moreover, a Guardian study 
of police killings in 2015 found that racial minorities constitute 
                                                 
* Lizette Rodriguez is a third-year law student at Pepperdine University 
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she enjoys going on adventures with her husband, having lunch with her mother, 
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1 Trayvon Martin Biography, BIOGRAPHY, 
https://www.biography.com/people/trayvon-martin-21283721 (last visited Jan. 24, 
2019). On February 26, 2012, seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin was walking 
home from buying snacks when George Zimmerman, an armed neighborhood 
watch volunteer, shot and killed him.  Id.  Zimmerman alerted the police when he 
saw Martin walking home, claiming that Martin was a suspicious individual.  Id.  
After being told not to confront Martin, Zimmerman decided to pursue Martin 
without identifying himself as a part of the community watch.  Id.  Zimmerman’s 
pursuit ended with the unarmed teenager being shot in the chest less than a 
hundred yards from the door of his home.   Id.   Zimmerman was later charged 
with second-degree murder, but was acquitted of all charges by the jury.  
2 Jelani Cobb, Stephan Clark and the Shooting of Black Men, Armed and 
Unarmed, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/stephon-clark-and-the-shooting-
of-black-men-armed-and-unarmed.  On the night of March 18, 2018, police 
officers shot and killed Stephon Clark in his grandmother’s backyard.  Id.  The 
police were responding to a call that someone was vandalizing the area when they 
saw Clark in his grandmother’s dark backyard and began their pursuit.  Id.  When 
a police officer shouted that Clark had a gun, they started shooting.  Id.  Clark was 
shot eight times and died on the scene.  Id.  There was no evidence of Clark having 
a gun on him, only a cell phone.  Id. 
3 German Lopez, There are huge racial disparities in how US police use 
force, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018, 4:12 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938186/police-shootings-killings-
racism-racial-disparities; Dara Lind, The FBI is trying to get better data on police 
killings. Here’s what we know now, VOX (Apr. 10, 2015, 10:31 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2014/8/21/6051043/how-many-people-killed-police-
statistics-homicide-official-black. 
4 Lopez, supra note 3; Lind, supra note 3. 





46.6% of the American population, but represented 62.7% of 
unarmed people police killed.5  After the killings of several unarmed 
black men, the “Black Lives Matter” movement took shape to “build 
local power and to intervene in violence inflicted on Black 
communities by the state and vigilantes.”6   
 As crucial as it is to bring attention to these incidents and 
demand change, it is almost equally important to dig deeper into the 
issue and see that students of color7 are being disproportionately 
punished in the classroom as well.8  It is a gross over-simplification 
to presume that the racial disparity in public school discipline trends 
is a result of students of color simply being more troublesome.  
However, calling it discrimination does not make it so.  In the legal 
realm, there is a remedy for discrimination.9  Traditionally, to 
                                                 
5 Lopez, supra note 3.  These statistics include deaths that resulted from the 
police’s use of tasers, police vehicles, deaths following altercations in police 
custody, and when officers used their guns.  Jon Swaine, Oliver Laughland & 
Jamiles Lartey, Black Americans killed by police twice as likely to be unarmed as 
white people, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015, 8:38 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/01/black-americans-killed-by-
police-analysis. 
6 About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2019).  
7 The term “students of color” in this refers to African-Americans and 
Hispanics.  Although Asians are also a minority, they are not as prominent in 
racial disparities in school discipline.  See generally Bach Mai Dolly Nguyen, 
Pedro Noguera, Nathan Adkins & Robert T. Teranishi, Ethnic Discipline Gap: 
Unseen Dimensions of Racial Disproportionality in School Discipline, 20 AM. 
EDUC. RES. J. 1, 1-29 (2019). 
8 “The Department of Justice and Department of Education announced today 
what we have known to be true for a long time: yes, race discrimination in school 
discipline is a real problem.”  Deborah Vagins, Is Race Discrimination in School 
Discipline a Real Problem?, ACLU (Jan. 8, 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/race-and-inequality-education/race-
discrimination-school-discipline-real-problem.  This paper will not discuss the 
school-to-prison pipeline theory, but it is worth mentioning that there is a serious 
concurrence with how children of color are viewed in America when it comes to 
discipline, punishment, and culpability—inside or outside of the classroom.  
School-to-Prison Pipeline, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-
justice/school-prison-pipeline (last visited Feb. 1, 2019). The school-to-prison-
pipeline theory argues that children of color are disproportionately funneled out of 
public schools and into juvenile and criminal justice systems due to reasons 
including underfunded schools, zero-tolerance, and other school discipline policies 
that remove children from school grounds.  Id.  
9 Civil Rights, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/civil_rights 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018); see generally What Remedies are There for 
Employment Discrimination Cases?, LEGALMATCH, 
https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/remedies-for-employment-
discrimination.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).  






establish that someone has engaged in discriminatory practices, the 
accuser must demonstrate that the person intended to be 
discriminatory.10  This article will discuss this notion in detail.  
According to the Equal Protection Clause, to pursue a legal 
remedy for this prominent racial disparity in school discipline, the 
plaintiff must be able to show that the school officials intended to 
discriminate against students of color.11  In this day and age, people 
are not openly declaring that their actions are a result of racial 
discrimination, making this a difficult standard to meet.12  Therefore, 
this article attempts to distinguish what legal remedies are available 
to the children affected and what the Department of Education can 
do to address the issues that the law cannot.13   
Section I considers the evolution of education in the United 
States and how American society dealt with racial discrimination in 
public schools in the past, and how those facts and decisions differ 
from the issues that students of color are facing today.14  Section II 
explains the Equal Protection Clause (EPC) and analyzes the seminal 
cases that demonstrate the power of the EPC and when it is 
appropriate to use it.15  Section III introduces Title VII and walks 
through violations of disparate impact discrimination and disparate 
treatment discrimination.16  Section IV explains what the Department 
of Education’s Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) is and what the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GOA) found after 
analyzing the 2013 and 2014 data on public school discipline across 
the country.17  Section V analyzes the GOA study facts with the legal 
standards of the EPC and Title VII to consider if Black students had 
a legal remedy under the current laws.18  Section VI uses Title VII as 
a template for new legislation that can better protect students against 
the current trends of public-school discipline.19  Section VII 
considers what current state of the country in regard to education and 
racial tensions more broadly and how Congress must react shift the 
                                                 
10 Equal Protection, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Equal_protection (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
11 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend XIV.  
12 See generally Margaret Renkl, How to Talk to a Racist, N.Y. TIMES (July 
30, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/opinion/how-to-talk-to-a-
racist.html. 
13 See infra Section I-IV.  
14 See infra Section I.  
15 See infra Section II.  
16 See infra Section III.  
17 See infra Section IV.  
18 See infra Section V.  
19 See infra Section VI. 





current trends.20  
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION IN AMERICA 
 
 “Bigotry is the disease of ignorance, of morbid minds; 
enthusiasm of the free and buoyant.  Education and free discussion 
are the antidotes of both.”21  Unfortunately, in its conception, 
American education failed to be an antidote to bigotry.  By the 
1830s, Massachusetts established a public school open to all students 
free of charge.22  Meanwhile, the other colonies relayed the onus of 
educating children to the home, leaving parents responsible to teach 
their children to read and write.23  In contrast, most southern states 
had laws forbidding slaves from learning to read and write during 
this time.24  During the Reconstruction, post-Civil War, African-
Americans in the South made alliances with white Republicans to 
guarantee free education for all people.25  Unfortunately, when 
federal troops withdrew from the South, whites regained control of 
the political authority and implemented systems of legal 
segregation.26   
In 1896, the United States Supreme Court held in Plessy v. 
Ferguson that segregation did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so long the segregated 
facilities were equal.27  Hence, the phrase “separate but equal”28 was 
born.  This decision was paramount because it demonstrated that the 
federal government officially recognized segregation as legal.29  
Thus, the Supreme Court sealed the fate of African-American 
children’s education for nearly sixty-years, because courts were 
                                                 
20 See infra Section VII. 
21 In the words of Thomas Jefferson: Why education matters, DESERET NEWS 
(Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.deseretnews.com/top/3087/0/In-the-words-of-
Thomas-Jefferson-Why-education-matters.html. 
22 Historical Timeline of Public Education in the US, RACE FORWARD, 
https://www.raceforward.org/research/reports/historical-timeline-public-education-
us (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
23 Ted Brackemyre, 18th Century, 19th Century Education to the Masses: The 
Rise of Public Education in Early America, U.S. HISTORY SCENE, 
http://ushistoryscene.com/article/rise-of-public-education/ (last visited Feb. 4, 
2019). 
24 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954); see also 
Historical Timeline of Public Education in the US, supra note 22.  
25 Historical Timeline of Public Education in the US, supra note 22. 
26 Id. 
27 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). 
28 Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
29 Historical Timeline of Public Education in the US, supra note 22. 






bound to abide by the legitimacy of segregation.30   
For example, in Briggs v. Elliot, the district court held that 
the state’s legislature segregating children was legitimate and 
referenced Plessy as the leading authority.31  Additionally, the court 
emphasized that the segregation of schools “has been held to be a 
valid exercise of legislative power even by courts of states where the 
political rights of the colored race have been longest and most 
earnestly enforced.”32  Nevertheless, the court issued an injunction to 
remedy the inequalities between the segregated schools.33  Lastly, in 
its dicta, the court argued that “if conditions have changed so that 
segregation is no longer wise, this is a matter for the legislatures and 
not for the courts.”34  Fortunately, the Supreme Court in 1954 did not 
have the same restraint.35   
 
A. Brown v. Board of Education 
 
 In 1954, the Supreme Court changed the course of American 
education when it held that separate but equal was “inherently 
unequal”36—eradicating the legitimacy of segregated public schools.   
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court needed to resolve 
whether public school segregation deprived African-Americans of 
their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.37  
The Court considered multiple variables before reaching its 
decision.38   
First, it addressed the argument that when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, racial segregation was practiced.39  The 
Court reasoned that proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment 
intended to “remove all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States.’”40   
Second, the Court contemplated the evolution of education in 
                                                 
30 Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 530, 537 (D.S.C. 1952) (“We do not think, 
however, that we are at liberty thus to disregard a decision of the Supreme Court 
which that court has not seen fit to overrule and which is expressly refrained from 
reexamining . . . .”). 
31 Id. at 532. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 538. 
34 Id. at 537.  
35 See infra Section I.A.  
36 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
37 Id. at 487–88. 
38 Id. at 486-96. 
39 Id. at 489. 
40 Id. 





the country and how segregation affected public education.41  The 
Court compared the educational practices when the amendment was 
adopted and the role education played in society in 1954.42  For 
example, they considered that in 1954 education was a function of 
state and local governments, compulsory attendance laws existed, 
and significant government spending occurred in support of 
education—demonstrating that American society now considered 
education to be a cornerstone of a democratic nation.43  Therefore, 
given the importance of education and the fact that the state “has 
undertaken to provide it, [education] is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.”44  Moreover, the Court was also 
concerned with the negative effect segregation had on African-
American children and their perception about their place in society.45  
Therefore, the Court held that “segregation is a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws.”46 
However, eradicating public school segregation did not 
single-handedly remove racial discrimination in schools.  
Unfortunately, racial discrimination transformed into something 
subtler—not signs excluding Blacks from school buildings, but 
rather, Black students being disproportionately removed from the 
classroom due to discipline decisions.47 
 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
 
 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall 
deprive to any person the equal protection of the laws.”48  The first 
rule of the EPC is that policymakers cannot use suspect 
classifications49 (race, national origin, alienage, same-sex 
                                                 
41 Id. at 492.  
42 Id. at 493. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. (emphasis added). 
45 Id. at 494 (“To separate [African-Americans] from others of similar age . . . 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be 
undone”).   
46 Id. at 495. 
47 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.: K-12 EDUC. DISCIPLINE 
DISPARITIES FOR BLACK STUDENTS, BOYS, AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 
(Mar. 2018) (DISCIPLINE DISPARITIES).  
48 U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
49 “Suspect classification refers to a class of individuals that have been 
historically subject to discrimination.” Suspect classification, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/suspect_classification (last visited Oct. 28, 
2019).  






relationships, gender, and illegitimacy) or the statute will be subject 
to judicial review according to the classification used.50  Thus, the 
Constitution is violated when a government practice or a law singles 
out a suspect classification for different treatment and the treatment 
is not based on a legitimate government interest.51 
 Moreover, “[t]he central purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official 
conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”52  However, the equal 
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take 
away all the states’ power of classification.53  The Court clarified 
that this provision does not guarantee “equal results,” only equal 
application of the law.54  “Most laws classify, and many affect 
certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no 
differently from all other members of the class described by the 
law.”55  Therefore, if a basic qualification is rationally based, 
unequal effects on different groups do not raise a constitutional 
concern.56  The Court in essence washes its hands of the law’s 
societal impact, because in Dandridge v. Williams it asserted that the 
legislature is accountable for the reverberating effects laws might 
have on society.57  Therefore, “[i]n assessing an equal protection 
challenge, a court is called upon only to measure the basic validity of 
the legislative classification.”58  However, an explicit racial 
classification in the legislation “regardless of purported motivation, 
is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an 
extraordinary justification.”59 
 As a result, for a petitioner to successfully present an Equal 
Protection Clause claim based on racial discrimination, they must 
                                                 
50 Id.  
51 Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, EXPLORING CONST. 
CONFLICTS, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019).  A legitimate government interest usually is when the 
law is to protect the citizen’s “health, safety, and economy.”  What is a Legitimate 
Interest?, LEGAL MATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/law-
library/article/legitimate-interest-lawyers.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).  
52 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).  
53 Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). 
54 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (Feeney). 
55 Id. at 271–72.   
56 Id. at 272; N.Y.C. Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-93 
(1979). 
57 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). 
58 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. 
59 Id.; see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 





show that a state actor purposefully discriminated.60  Systemic 
exclusion of eligible people of the prescribed race or an unequal 
application of the law to such an extent can demonstrate purpose.61  
Additionally, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be 
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact that 
the law bears more heavily on one race than the another.62   
 Thus, when there is proof that a discriminatory purpose is a 
motivating factor, strict scrutiny applies.63  Discriminatory purpose 
implies that the decision maker selected a particular course of action 
because of its adverse effects on an identifiable group.64  The Court 
reasoned that while it cannot control such prejudices, neither can it 
tolerate them.65 
 
A.     Cases Where an EPC Was Not Found 
 
 1.    Washington v. Davis  
 
In Washington v. Davis, the Court established that the 
racially disproportionate impact of a law does not signify that the 
law violates the EPC.66  The Court found that for a neutral law to 
violate the EPC, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
disproportionate impact can be “traced to a purpose to discriminate 
on the basis of race.”67 In Washington, the plaintiffs were a group of 
black men that applied to be police officers in the District of 
Columbia, but were unsuccessful.68  They alleged that the 
department’s recruiting procedures were racially discriminatory 
because it excluded a disproportionately high number of Black 
applicants.69  To be admitted into the Department’s seventeen-week 
training program, an individual had to satisfy “certain physical and 
character standards, to be a high school graduate or its equivalent, 
and to receive a grade of at least [forty] out of [eighty] on ‘Test 
[twenty-one]’.”70  After considering the facts presented, the Court 
found that the recruiting procedures, specifically Test twenty-one, 
                                                 
60 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. 
61 Id. at 279. 
62 Id. at 272. 
63 Id. at 273. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 272; see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
66 Davis, 426 U.S. at 236.  
67 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260 
68 Davis, 426 U.S. at 232-33. 
69 Id. at 233. 
70 Id. at 234.  






was a racially neutral test which served the government purpose of 
pursuing a certain degree of competence.71  The Court emphasized 
that the test “[sought] to ascertain whether those who took it [] 
acquired a particular level of verbal skill.”72  Therefore, “simply 
because a greater proportion of [blacks] fail to qualify than members 
of other racial or ethnic groups”73 does not establish racial 
discrimination because it is an “otherwise valid qualifying test.”74  
The Court did not place weight on the allegation that the test favored 
one race over others, because members of other races also did not 
pass the exam.75  Therefore, to uphold this discrimination claim 
would support the idea that government actors could not discriminate 
based on competency.76  Thus, the Court found that there was an 
equal application of the law, even if it did not yield equal results.77   
Consequently, this distinction limits an individual’s ability to 
make a Fourteenth Amendment claim because he must have 
evidence to establish that the purpose of the law is to discriminate—
racially disproportionate impact of a statute is not, in itself, evidence 
of a discriminatory purpose.78  Lastly, the Court rationalized that if it 
invalidated facially neutral law simply because it “benefits or 
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would 
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range 
of tax [and] welfare . . . statutes . . . .”79 
 
 2.     Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 
 
In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the 
Court held that the Massachusetts statute that allowed veteran 
                                                 
71 Id. at 245-46.   
72 Id. at 245. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 246. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 245-46.   
“Had respondents, along with all others who had failed Test [twenty-one], 
whether white or black, brought an action claiming that the test denied each of 
them equal protection of the laws as compared with those who had passed with 
high enough scores to qualify them as police recruits, it is most unlikely that their 
challenge would have been sustained.”   
    Id. at 245.  
77 Id. at 248.  
78 Id. at 247.  “[A] law or other official act, without regard to whether it 
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has 
a racially disproportionate impact.”  Id. at 239. 
79 Id. at 248. 





preference in state and civil service positions did not violate the 
EPC.80  In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the statute was 
gender discrimination because it “inevitably operates to exclude 
women from consideration for the best [state] civil service 
jobs . . . .”81   
However, the Court found the statutory classification facially 
neutral.82  The Court reasoned that “the definition of ‘veterans’ in the 
statute [was] always [] neutral as to gender . . .  Massachusetts 
[]consistently defined veteran status in a way that [] [was] inclusive 
of women who [] served in the military . . . [and] Veteran status is 
not uniquely male.”83  The Court further analyzed whether the 
neutral classification adversely affected women.84  The Court 
considered the legislative intent of the statute to determine whether 
the statute’s purpose was to be discriminatory against women.85  The 
Court found that when the statute’s purpose was to “prefer 
‘veterans’”—nothing more.86  Therefore, the Court held that the 
statute did not violate plaintiff’s right to equal protection because 
there was no evidence to support intentional discrimination.87 
 
 3.    Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
 
 In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing, the 
Village of Arlington Heights denied a housing development 
corporation (MHDC) its request to rezone a single-family parcel into 
a multiple-family classification.88  MHDC89 claimed that its “denial 
                                                 
80 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281. 
81 Id. at 259.  This case differs from Washington v. Davis because it was 
dealing with a gender-based classification rather than a race-based classification.  
See Davis, 426 U.S. at 233.  Nevertheless, gender is included under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).  In its analysis, the 
Court repeated the precedent that “any state law overtly or covertly designed to 
prefer males over females in public employment would require an exceedingly 
persuasive justification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273. 
82 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 279.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 275. 
87 Id. at 279. 
88 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254 
(1977). 
89 The court considered the issue of standing with MHDC as the petitioner, but 
found that MHDC had standing as a party “with a personal stake in the outcome of 
the controversy.” Id. at 261 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 






was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia, the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”90  However, the Court held that given 
all of the evidence the zoning committee presented and facts of the 
case, MHDC failed to prove that “discriminatory purpose was a 
motivating factor in the [v]illage’s decision.”91 
 MHDC was a nonprofit developer that specialized in building 
low and moderate-income housing throughout the Chicago area.92  In 
the Village of Arlington Heights, MHDC entered into an agreement 
with a landowner to buy a parcel of land and convert it into multi-
family housing that would be subsidized and affirmatively advertised 
to assure that the “subsidized development [was] racially 
integrated.”93  During three public meetings, the Plan Commission 
considered the rezoning request.94  The main opposition to the 
rezoning request was that the area was always zoned as a single-
family parcel and neighboring citizens relied on this classification; as 
a result, rezoning would “threaten[] to cause a measurable drop in 
property value for neighboring sites.”95  Additionally, the Plan 
Commission was concerned that the single-family housing zones 
were a “buffer between single-family development and land uses 
thought incompatible, such as commercial or manufacturing 
districts.”96   
 In its holding, the Court considered Washington v. Davis and 
held that a state action that results in racially disproportionate impact 
would not be found to be unconstitutional unless the petitioner can 
also show that the state action was purposely or intentionally racially 
discriminatory.97  Here, the petitioner, MHDC, claimed that the 
rezoning denial was racially discriminatory because the decision 
would negatively impact racial minorities more than whites.98  
However, the Court found that the Village had “adopted its buffer 
policy long before MHDC entered the picture and has applied the 
policy too consistently for us to infer discriminatory purpose from its 
application in this case.”99  
 Therefore, with this decision the Court enhanced the 
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importance of Washington v. Davis and the rule that the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not violated simply because there is evidence of 
disproportionate impact.  The holding highlights the Court’s 
commitment to the standard that the petitioner must demonstrate that 
the disproportionate impact is a result of a purposeful 
discrimination.100 
 
B.    Cases where the Court Found a Violation of the EPC 
 
1.    Castaneda v. Partida 
 
In Castaneda, a Texas prisoner filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus alleging discrimination against Mexican-Americans in 
the selection of the grand jury who indicted him.101  The Court held 
that the prisoner “made out a ‘bare prima facie case’ of invidious 
discrimination with proof of a ‘long continued disproportion in the 
composition of the grand juries in Hidalgo County.’”102  Therefore, 
“the burden of proof shift[ed] to the State to rebut the presumption of 
unconstitutional action by showing that the racially disproportionate 
results came from neutral selection criteria and procedures . . . .”103   
However, the Court found that there was a motive for 
discrimination even though a Mexican-American majority currently 
ran the government.104  “[We] have rejected—that human beings 
would not discriminate against their own kind—in order to find that 
the presumption of purposeful discrimination was rebutted.”105 
 
2.    Loving v. Virginia 
 
 In Loving v. Virginia, an interracial married couple were 
convicted of violating an anti-miscengation statute and sentenced to 
not return to Virginia for twenty-five years.106  The Court held that 
Virginia’s statutory scheme “to prevent marriages between persons 
solely on the basis of racial classification” violated the Fourteenth 
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Amendment.107   
In its analysis, the Court responded to Virginia’s argument.108  
Virginia reasoned that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment because, despite its “reliance on racial 
classifications,”109 the law punished both whites and blacks equally 
for interracial marriage; therefore, there was no evidence of 
“invidious discrimination” based on race.110  However, the Court 
completely rejected the “notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a 
statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the 
classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription of all 
invidious racial discrimination . . . .”111   
The Court distinguished this case from other cases in which 
the equal application theory had sufficed to prevent a valid 
Fourteenth Amendment claim.  The Court acknowledged that 
Virginia relied on the holding in Pace v. Alabama.112  In that case, 
the Court upheld a statute that penalized interracial adultery or 
fornication because “the statute could not be said to discriminate 
against [blacks] because the punishment for each participant in the 
offense was the same.”113  However, the Court rejected this 
reasoning in Loving and clarified that it no longer was applicable to 
subsequent decisions.114  Instead, the Court asserted the notion that 
“[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial 
discrimination . . . .”115  As a result, the Court found the statute 
intended to limit who a person could marry116 based on her race, 
while the state’s only possible objective was to maintain white 
supremacy.117  Thus, the statute “violate[d] the central meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause.”118 
Thus, the Court assertively rejected the theory that equal 
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application can be used to deny an Equal Protection claim.119  
Additionally, the Court shed some light on how a state would 
possibly combat a Fourteenth Amendment claim; by showing that 
the racial classification serves a legitimate state objective and the 
classification is necessary to accomplish that goal.120   
 
3.    Palmore v. Sidoti 
 
 In Palmore v. Sidoti, the state revoked a mother’s custody of 
her child because her ex-husband filed a petition to remove the child 
due to a change in circumstances.121  The change was that the white 
mother was cohabiting with an African-American man and soon 
married him.122  Nevertheless, the trial court found that there was 
“no issue as to either party’s devotion to the child, adequacy of the 
housing facilities, or respectability of the new spouse of either 
parent.”123  The lower courts found that it was in the child’s best 
interest for the father to raise her, because if she remained with her 
mother when she started school she would be “more vulnerable to 
peer pressures, [and] suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure 
to come [from her mother’s biracial relationship].”124 
 The Supreme Court typically does not hear cases based on 
family law.125  However, the Court intervened here because of the 
facts and the lower court’s lack of adequate reasoning to remove the 
child, which gave rise to the concern that the “Constitution’s 
commitment to eradicating discrimination based on race” was not 
respected.126  The Court reversed and held that the lower court based 
its holding on race, because there was no evidence that the child’s 
welfare was in jeopardy if she remained with her mother.127  The 
Court stating that “[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices 
[against biracial relationships] but neither can it tolerate them.”128 
 Therefore, the Court held that the mother’s Fourteenth 
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Amendment rights were violated based on her husband’s race.129  
The burden shifted to the government to show how the classification 
served a compelling government interest, because the holding was 
exclusively based on the suspect classification of race.130 
 
 
IV. TITLE VII 
 
 Congress has the authority to “enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of the [Fourteenth Amendment]” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.131  Under this authority Congress created 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to remedy workplace 
discrimination.132  Title VII prohibits an employer “to fail or refuse 
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”133  Title VII’s goal is to 
ensure “equality of opportunity and meritocracy” among individuals 
applying for jobs—not that a person must be hired because they are 
part of a group that has been historically discriminated against.134  
The courts found that Congress intended Title VII to remove 
“artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when 
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial 
or other impermissible classification.”135  The difference between the 
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII is that the latter is Congress 
enacted positive law, while the former is a constitutional right.136  
With that distinction, Title VII specifically relates to workplace 
discrimination and provides four different avenues through which an 
individual can seek relief: (1) disparate treatment, (2) disparate 
impact, (3) hostile work environment, and (4) retaliation.137   
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A.     Legal Standard 
 
 This section discusses disparate treatment and disparate 
impact.138 
1.    Disparate Treatment 
 
 The disparate treatment provision of Title VII makes it 
unlawful for employers to use race, or any of the other 
aforementioned classifications, as a factor in an employment 
decision.139  Courts found that disparate treatment is the “most easily 
understood type of discrimination and occur[s] where an employer 
treated a particular person less favorable than others because of a 
protected trait.”140  The prominent aspect of disparate treatment is 
that an employer cannot treat a  person differently because of a 
protected class,141 which makes this provision the most similar to 
Equal Protections Clause protections.142 
 Moreover, to bring a disparate treatment Title VII claim, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had a “discriminatory 
intent or motive for taking a job-related action.”143  In order to 
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must be able to prove four 
elements: “(1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he is 
qualified for his position;  
(3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the 
circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.”144  Once 
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of 
discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the employer to present 
a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason to justify the decision.145  
If the employer satisfies its burden of production, the court will raise 
a presumption in favor of the employer146 unless the plaintiff can 
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prove the employer’s reason was not genuine.147  Before moving 
forward with the trial, it is the “‘Court’s responsibility . . . to 
‘examine the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could 
satisfy his ‘ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.’”148  
Therefore, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer 
manifested intent before his day in court.   
 Because many employment decisions are left to the 
employer’s discretion, it is harder to establish intent in many 
situations.149  Therefore, another avenue must be available to remedy 
the discrimination that cannot be sufficiently established in this 
provision.  
2.     Disparate Impact 
 
 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court opened the door to 
Title VII claims based on disparate impact rather than disparate 
treatment.150  The Court reasoned that Congress’ objective for Title 
VII was to create equal opportunity employment and remove barriers 
that allowed employers to favor white employees.151  Therefore, the 
Court found that “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face 
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they 
operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices.”152  This holding significantly distinguished Title VII from 
the EPC because a plaintiff can seek relief without establishing 
intent.  
 Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 formally codified the 
prohibition of disparate impact discrimination.153  Under the statute’s 
disparate impact provision, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
violation when the employer uses a facially neutral employment 
practice that causes a disparate impact.154  Courts typically addressed 
Title VII disparate impact claims with a three-step dance.155   
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 First, the plaintiff must establish prima facie case of 
discrimination.156  A prima facie case is typically established when 
there is data that a policy created a statistical disparity between 
members of two different groups.157  Under this provision, statistical 
disparity is sufficient to demonstrate discrimination because an 
employer is liable for the results of his actions, not his state of 
mind.158  Nevertheless, the statistical disparity in the outcome of an 
employment decision or policy must be relevant in showing that 
“although neutral, the policy in question imposes a significantly 
adverse or disproportionate impact on a protected group of 
individuals.”159  Second, the employer is able to rebut the presented 
statistical disparity or demonstrate that the policy is related to the job 
and is a business necessity.160  Third, the plaintiff can show that 
there is an alternative, non-discriminatory practice, that would not 
result in the disparate impact to rebut the employer’s business 
necessity assertion.161   
 This procedure demonstrates that the objective of Title VII is 
to prevent employment discrimination, yet it still acknowledges that 
some practices are necessary although they might result in unequal 
outcomes.162  Thus, the important aspect of the Title VII’s disparate 
impact provision is that it alleviates the plaintiff’s burden to get 
inside the employer’s head.163  In addition, it serves as a platform 
where both parties are accountable for finding an alternative 
practice, which serves its workplace purpose without ostracizing a 
particular group. 
 
B.     Case Examples of Title VII 
 
This section will discuss Pacheco and Ricci.  
 
1.     Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital 
 
 In Pacheco, the court held that the employer did not violate 
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the disparate treatment nor disparate impact provision of Title VII.164  
Both violations were based on plaintiff’s allegation that the 
hospital’s “English-only” policy discriminated against Hispanic 
employees.165  Plaintiff identified as Hispanic by national origin and 
spoke both English and Spanish.166  The hospital granted plaintiff his 
request for a lateral transfer to the Ambulatory Referral Registration 
Area (ARRA).167  However, during his time in the ARRA, several 
patients complained to the plaintiff’s supervisor that plaintiff and 
others were making fun and laughing at them in a different 
language.168 As a result, his supervisor asked plaintiff to only speak 
in English while performing his duties and in the presence of 
patients, but he could speak Spanish off-duty.169  Before his ARRA 
transfer probation period ended, he requested to return to his 
previous department and filed suit against his supervisor.170 
 Taking into consideration the facts plaintiff presented, the 
court first considered the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim.171  
The court assumed that a prima facie case of discrimination was 
presented and immediately considered the employer’s reasoning 
behind the purported “English-only” policy.172  The court found that 
there was no discriminatory intent in asking the plaintiff to speak 
English on-duty and it was a business necessity because they 
received complaints about employees speaking a different language 
while working.173  More importantly, the court emphasized that the 
plaintiff was not prohibited from speaking Spanish off-duty, nor was 
he penalized for when he did speak Spanish in front of the 
patients.174  Therefore, the court did not find discriminatory intent 
behind the employer requesting that the plaintiff not speak Spanish 
in front of the patients.175 
 Second, the court analyzed the disparate impact claim and 
found that the plaintiff failed to defend his claim because he did not 
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refute his employer’s business necessity argument.176  The court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim because he did not 
provide an alternative practice and “did not produce any evidence 
that the limited English-only practice at issue was contested by any 
other Spanish-speaking employees, let alone that it 
disproportionately affected such employees.”177  Therefore, although 
it may appear that the threshold for a disparate impact claim is low, 
the court remains responsible to assure that it is not being used 
haphazardly. 
 
2.    Ricci v. DeStefano 
 
 In Ricci, the Court held that an “employer must have a strong 
basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate impact 
liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory 
action.”178  This is a different holding because the facts were 
distinguishable from typical discrimination cases.  In this case, the 
plaintiffs were nonminority employees that were denied their place 
in the promotion pool because their employers did not use the results 
of a prior test because they believed it caused a disparate impact on 
minority employees.179  Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
employer engaged in disparate treatment when the it “rejected the 
test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were 
white.”180  The plaintiffs argued that an employer could not engage 
in intentional discrimination to avoid unintentional discrimination.181 
 The Court considered the innate purpose of Title VII and 
restated the idea that its main objective “is to promote hiring on the 
basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or 
color.”182  The Court reasoned that while Congress made employers 
liable for neutral practices that caused unintentional discrimination, 
it prohibited employers from “taking adverse employment actions 
‘because of’ race[.]”183  The strong basis in evidence standard was a 
way to remedy conflicts between Title VII’s intent.184  The premise 
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here was that the employer took various steps to ensure that the test 
employees took to enter the promotion pool was legitimate and did 
not discriminate against minorities.185  Yet, when the test results 
showed that white candidates had outperformed minority 
candidates—and the minority candidates threatened to sue—the 
employer threw out the results.186  The Court responded that “once 
[a] process has been established and employers have made clear their 
selection criteria, they may not then invalidate the test results, thus 
upsetting an employee’s legitimate expectation not to be judged on 
the basis of race.”187  Therefore, if an employer intends to participate 
in disparate treatment discrimination to prevent disparate impact 
liability, they must show that there is evidence that an 
“impermissible disparate impact, amounts to the sort of racial 
preference that Congress has disclaimed.”188  This standard restrains 
an employer’s ability to consider disparate impact minority 
discrimination because Congress intended that the workplace 
become a place of equal opportunity for all under Title VII.   
 Therefore, it appears that Title VII allows the courts to be 
involved with the facts of the case when determining if a practice 
constitutes discrimination.189  Moreover, Title VII allows courts to 
juxtapose the statistical disparity impact with the goal of eradicating 
the historical status quo in the workplace.190  In many ways, this is a 
byproduct of Title VII being a positive law created with a specific 
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V.    DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DATA ON SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 
ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 
 
A.    The Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) Studies  
 
 Since 1968, the United States Department of Education 
conducts the CRDC studies to collect data on key education and civil 
rights issues in the public school system.193  The information 
gathered during the studies includes but is not limited to: student 
enrollment, educational programs and services, discipline reports, 
and educational equity reports.194  Moreover, the CRDC data is 
accessible to the public on their website.195  The public can search 
the data by school and district.196  Therefore, individuals can look at 
the data of a specific school or compare trends across the country.197  
More importantly, the CRDC collects data from every public school 
and school district in the country.198  This allows organizations like 
the United States Government Accountability Office to analyze the 
information to understand national issues, rather than attribute them 
to idiosyncratic districts or schools.199  
 
B.  The Government Office of Accountability Study 
 
 The Government Office of Accountability (GOA) used the 
information the CRDC gathered for the 2013 to 2014 school year to 
identify patterns in disciplinary actions among public schools across 
the nation.200  Additionally, the GOA interviewed federal and state 
officials from five states to gain a better understanding of the 
information the CRDC provided for the states.201  The GOA 
specifically selected the five states because there was a 
distinguishable disparity in suspension rates for black students and 
students with disabilities and diversity in size and location.202  
Therefore, the GOA studies go beyond the CRDC numbers because 
it attempts to further understand the information to identify racial 
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issues that are present in public schools.203  It is particularly useful 
here, because simply analyzing state-by-state or district-by-district 
results would limit its applicability to that region’s scope.   
 
1.   Findings 
 
 In a brief synopsis, the GOA presented its findings that 
public grade schools disproportionately disciplined black students.204  
In fact, the GOA found that this disciplinary racial disparity persisted 
“regardless of the type of disciplinary action, level of school poverty, 
or type of public school . . . these students attended.”205  To 
understand the disparities, the GOA created charts to demonstrate 
the stark differences among the race of the students.206   
 
 Nevertheless, to understand the charts in relation to school 
discipline, one must understand the racial makeup of the students 
attending public schools across the nation.  Figure 1 demonstrates 
that across the country, white students account for 50.3% of the 
population, while Hispanic students account for 24.7%, black 
students account for 15.5%, Asian students account for 5.3%, while 
American Indian, Alaska Natives, and mixed-race students account 
for 4.2% of the school population.207  Because white students 
account for more than a majority of the student’s population, it 
follows that white students account for the majority of other 
findings.  The rationale is that the racial classification should only 
represent the percentage that it contributes to the makeup of the 
public school population.  Therefore, if a racial classification 
represents a larger percent than its population in a given 
classification, than it is overrepresented in that classification.  
 The GOA analyzed the information the CRDC collected on 
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public school discipline across the country and created Figure 2.208  
The graph below shows the six different forms of discipline across 
the country and the racial classification of the students being 
disciplined in that way.209  This information can serve as the 
cornerstone of an EPC claim because it demonstrates a racially 
disproportionate impact through school discipline practices.210  The 
disproportion occurs because black students are significantly 
overrepresented in all levels of discipline.211  In particular, 
“[a]lthough there were approximately 17.4 million more White 
students than Black students attending K[indergarten through 
twelve] public schools in 2013 [and 20]14, nearly 176,000 more 
Black students than White students were suspended from school that 
school year.”212  Despite more white children being enrolled in 
public school, schools punish black children more than white 
children.213  Some commentators blame this tendency on other 
variables such as poverty, alleging that poverty affects a child’s 
development and their ability to focus in school and avoid 
discipline.214  However, the GAO found that poverty levels do not 
affect schools disciplining Black students more.215  
 
VI.     ANALYSIS 
 
 This section will apply the EPC and Title VII to the GAO 
findings.  
 
A.     Applying the EPC to GAO Findings 
 
 The Equal Protection Clause gives individuals the right to the 
equal protection of the law—providing a legal remedy to 
discrimination.216  However, discrimination is a legal term with 
elements that the plaintiff must establish to prove discrimination and 
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obtain a legal remedy.217  According to the Equal Protection Clause, 
an individual must demonstrate that the state actor intended to 
discriminate.218  Although a plaintiff could assert a violation of the 
EPC by claiming that there is invidious discrimination due to a 
statistically disproportionate racial impact, the plaintiff still has the 




Unfortunately here, the ability for black students to assert a 
discriminatory intent in the way their educators conduct discipline is 
almost impossible because educators do not openly label themselves 
as racist.220  Otherwise, the EPC requires the students to read the 
mind of school officials and discover the various reasons behind 
their discipline decision to prove that the motive of their decision is 
the student’s race.221  Nevertheless, it is clear from the numbers that 
there is a significant, disproportionate racial impact on how schools 
are disciplining children across the nation.222 
 The facts of this situation are like Castaneda.223  In 
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Castaneda, the plaintiff presented a prima facie case of 
discrimination by showing a statistical disparity in the amount of 
Mexican-American citizens that the state court included in the grand 
jury selection process.224  The Court determined that the plaintiff had 
made a prima facie case of invidious discrimination because  
“‘[s]ometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than 
race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the 
governing legislation appears neutral on its face.’”225   
 Similarly here, the schools’ discipline systems are facially 
neutral, yet the numbers across the country show that there is a clear 
pattern in public school discipline that is facially unexplainable on 
grounds other than race.  Thus, there are multiple theories as to why 
black children have higher rates of discipline.  For example, the 
GAO study presented the theory that “[c]hildren’s behavior in school 
may be affected by health and social challenges outside the 
classroom that tend to be more acute for poor children, including 
minority children who experience higher rates of poverty.”226  
However, even if outside variables, such as poverty, affect a child’s 
behavior and, therefore, their discipline, should there not be a greater 
correlation between poverty levels and discipline than between race 
and discipline?  Instead, according to Figure 6,227 poverty does not 
seem to have a distinguishable impact on discipline like race does.228 
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Even if black students could adequately establish a prima 
facie case of invidious discrimination based on a clear unexplainable 
pattern, they would still have to rebut the school officials’ 
demonstration that the discipline guidelines used “permissible 
racially neutral selection criteria and procedures [that] have 
produced the monochromatic result.”229  Because there is no 
evidence that schools are not using neutral discipline guidelines, it is 
unlikely that the students will able to move forward with their 
case.230   
 Therefore, the EPC does not provide an adequate legal 
remedy for black students statistically overrepresented in discipline 
matters, because the students must prove they are receiving this 
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B.  Applying Title VII to GAO Findings 
 
 Unlike the EPC, which hinges on intent for a cause of action, 
Title VII provides statutory relief for discrimination based on 
disparate impact.232  As a result, black students have a stronger 
footing under a Title VII claim.233   
First, black students would have to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination.234  Here, the prima facie case would be the 
overrepresentation of black students in school discipline across the 
country.235  The court would likely find this statistical racial disparity 
to be sufficient to establish a prima facie case because it 
demonstrates that despite the “neutral” discipline guidelines in 
schools, “the policy in question imposes a significantly adverse or 
disproportionate impact on a protected group of individuals’”236  
Second, the school officials would have to rebut the statistical 
disparity, or demonstrate that the discipline guidelines are a 
necessity.237  School officials may argue that the guidelines are a 
necessity because the children’s safety and well-being are at stake.238  
Regardless of their response, the benefit of Title VII is that it gives 
the plaintiff the ability to demonstrate that there is an alternative that 
would serve the same necessity.239  Fortunately, the GAO study 
revealed that some schools are already taking progressive steps to 
deal with the issue of racial disparity and the discipline guidelines.240  
For example, school districts across the country are “implementing 
alternative discipline models that emphasize preventing challenging 
student behavior and focus on supporting individuals and the school 
community.”241  They are using techniques such as restorative 
justice, social-emotional learning, positive behavioral interventions, 
and supports.242  Therefore, black students would likely succeed in 
their Title VII case against school officials for disparate impact 
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VII.  TITLE E: A POSITIVE LAW FOR EDUCATION BASED ON TITLE 
VII 
 
 The disparate impact provision of Title VII came from the 
courts and Congress realizing that schools cannot maintain facially 
and intentionally neutral practices “if they operate to ‘freeze’ the 
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”243  
Therefore, this positive law came from the understanding that 
society cannot forget past discrimination when considering the 
lasting present effects and that people can unintentionally 
discriminate.244  Discrimination, regardless of intent, promotes and 
preserves the status quo that this country attempted to stop when it 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.245  
 Here, there is arguably a case of discrimination because 
schools are disproportionately disciplining black students.246  To 
state it more bluntly, schools are removing black students from the 
classroom at higher rates than their white counterparts.247  Given the 
history of African-Americans and education in this country, it is 
plausible that the schools are discipling black students because they 
believe the historical notion that African-American children do not 
belong in the classroom.248  Consequently, the current discipline 
guidelines appear to “‘freeze’ the status quo of prior 
discriminatory”249 educational school practices.  Given the critical 
importance of education, it is time to provide a legal remedy against 
disparate impact discrimination for students.  It is time for Title E.  
Title E would essentially mirror the disparate impact 
provision of Title VII.  The hope is that Title E will provide a legal 
remedy for students in a way that the EPC currently does not.  
Congress and the Courts recognized that finding discriminatory 
intent in a person’s actions is harder than when racial discrimination 
was socially acceptable in the United States—accusing someone of 
racism is a serious offense today.250  Therefore, the disparate impact 
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provision of Title VII allowed employees to bring claims when 
procedures looked, sounded, and felt like discrimination, but was not 
intentional discrimination.251  Moreover, the disparate impact 
provision benefitted employers because it allowed them to 
acknowledge a problem in their procedures without having to admit 
to racism.252    
 
A. Legal Standard of Title E 
 
Similar to Title VII, Title E would have a three-step process 
to establish a claim of disparate impact discrimination.253  First, the 
student would have to present data that there is a statistical racial 
disparity in the outcome of discipline practices.254  As mentioned 
before, Title E is not concerned with whether the educators 
subjectively engage in racial bias or not.  Instead it is focused on 
ensuring that schools do not use neutral policies to protect a 
historical status-quo that kept children of color out of the 
classroom.255  However, plaintiffs cannot use Title E for every 
disproportionate impact that adversely affects a child’s education 
directly.  
Second, school officials would have the opportunity to either 
rebut the statistical disparity or demonstrate how the discipline 
practices are necessary to promote their educational mission.256   
This aspect of Title E acknowledges that school officials should 
decide what discipline strategy is the most effective with their 
students.  Therefore, Title E does not intend to strip school 
administrators from their agency or to hinder their ability to ensure 
school safety.  Instead, Title E serves as a measure of accountability.  
It allows students to draw attention to procedures that negatively 
affect them and forces school officials to either accept and remedy 
the situation or explain its procedure to a judge.   
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Third, and most importantly, the student would have the 
opportunity to present an alternative procedure that would not result 
in the same disproportionate impact.257  This aspect of Title E is 
critical because it puts the power of innovation and change in the 
hands of the students.  It allows them to take control of their 
education and be agents in their communities.  Additionally, it is 
important because it focuses on providing an alternative to the 
current procedures, instead of simply eliminating them and not 
providing a replacement.  More importantly, the purpose of Title E is 
not to demonize school administrators—it is to acknowledge and 
remedy institutionalized barriers that came from the foundation of 
education in this country.   
Title E can genuinely thrive because students will have the 
opportunity to use their own experiences to provide an alternative 
form of discipline.  Students, like school officials, understand the 
inward dynamics of a school and even the classroom.  They can 
provide critical insight into what discipline works, which can even 
lead to a greater understanding between the school officials and 
students as to the core of school discipline.  
Thus, Title E is not proposed to be a fix-all law.  Instead, the 
hope is that it would be an avenue through which students could 
reclaim their education.   
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The Equal Protection Clause is a constitutional right all 
citizens have to the equal protection of the law.  However, equal 
protection of the law does not guarantee equal results, and unequal 
results do not signify discrimination.  Consequently, for a person that 
suffered from the disproportionate impact of the law to claim that it 
violated her EPC right, she must show it was intentional 
discrimination.  She must prove that the man behind the curtain 
intended to discriminate against their protected trait.  However, the 
difficulty of the EPC is that it is hard to prove a person’s state of 
mind.  
 The legislature passed a positive law, Title VII, which 
ensures that job applicants have an equal opportunity to 
employment.  Congress and the courts recognized that discrimination 
could occur without anyone intending it to and included the disparate 
impact provision as an avenue to a legal remedy.  This opened the 
door to alleviating discrimination in ways that the EPC could not, 
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because it no longer required the plaintiff to prove thoughts, only 
results.  
 The CRDC and GAO studies provided results that some 
people knew—that schools discipline black children at statistically 
disproportionate rates in public schools.  The GAO numbers do not 
lie.  There can be alternative reasoning, but the numbers show that 
there is a problem—and it is discrimination.  Unfortunately, under 
the EPC looking like discrimination is not enough to seek a legal 
remedy.  However, school discipline is an aspect of education that 
permeates the student’s life inside and outside of the classroom.  It is 
important to question why black children experience more discipline, 
instead of assuming they are more disobedient.  Such an assumption 
would only protect a racial status quo this country has striven to 
dismantle for the past fifty-years.  
 It is time for Congress to rise and create positive law that 
protects the children of this country in areas that the drafters of the 
Constitution did not consider.  It is time for Title E.  
 
 
